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Abstract
Using a household production model of educational choices, we characterise a free-market
situation in which some agents (high wagers) fully educate their children and spend a sizable
amount of resources on them, while others (low wagers) educate them only partially. The
free-market equilibrium is iniquitous, both because the households have di¤erent resources
and because the children have di¤erent access to education. Public policy is thus called
for, for vertical as well as horizontal equity purposes. Conventional wisdom has it that
both objectives could be achieved using price control instruments, i.e. income taxes and
price subsidies. We nd instead that income taxes reduce equality of opportunity and that
price subsidies cannot remedy this. Quantity controls become necessary: a compulsory
education package, nanced by a redistributive tax system, achieves both types of equity.
Redistributive taxation and compulsory education are therefore best seen as complementary
policies.
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I Introduction
In what sense might parents constrain rather than favour the development of their children?
Mostly by under-investing in their education, a phenomenon which is by now accepted as a
stylized fact in the literature. There are two competing explanations for this.
 First, there is the standard beckerian view (e.g. Becker et al. 1990) according to which
parents see education as a consumption good whose enjoyment may be limited by liquidity
constraints: parents are altruistic towards their children, and would like to spend as much
as possible in their education, but they might be unable to a¤ord the level of outlay which
would be optimal given the potential abilities of the children. The obvious remedy for
this is a redistributive policy that transfers more resources towards the needy. At least
for primary and secondary education,1 a more market-oriented solution is di¢ cult to nd,
as there is no credit market for the investment in education due to the lack of collateral
(future income is normally unacceptable).
 An alternative view sees education as an investment also from the standpoint of the par-
ents and not only of the children: this perspective is related to the "exchange model" of
the family pioneered e.g. by Cigno (1993). Selsh family members engage in transfers
regulated by self-enforcing rules specifying rewards for obedience and punishments for
deviations. The resulting system may be ine¢ cient for several reasons, the most relevant
being that parents, when investing in their childrens education, foresee that they will
be able to reap only a fraction of the return, and tend therefore to under-invest. Redis-
tribution is clearly ine¤ective, whereas the subsidization of educational expenditure, by
lowering the cost of investment, might work (Anderberg and Balestrino, 2003).
The results from the empirical literature are hardly decisive. It is true that the testable
implications of the altruistic model are usually not veried (e.g. Altonji et al. 1992, 1997),
whereas those of the exchange model are more consistently found to be holding (e.g. Cigno et
al. 1998, 2006). It has however been argued that the test usually employed for the altruistic
model is unnecessarily restrictive, and that at this stage of our general knowledge there is no
denitive case in favour of one or the other approach (McGarry 2000).
1This is not necessarily true for higher education, see for example Oei and Ring (2014) on the US case.
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A point which we might want to stress is however that neither view recommends an education
policy that includes, among other things, compulsory schooling.2 This is in stark contrast with
what actually happens in virtually all the developed countries, and has been happening for the
past 150-plus years. It is a historical fact that education policy was conceived in terms of free
and mandatory public schooling (nanced by public funds) when it was introduced during the
XIX century in the West (Germany, France and later UK and US); and free and mandatory
schooling is still at the basis of our educational systems today.3 Compulsory schooling is,
instead, still at stake in many less developed countries where universal primary education is far
from having been achieved, especially for girls.
Economists are always suspicious of policy interventions that seem to thwart individual
freedom or consumer sovereignty. It has however been recognised, at least since the contributions
of Neary and Roberts (1980) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1984), that in a second-best world
quantitative restrictions may be welfare-improving inasmuch as they enhance the e¢ ciency and
the redistributive impact of the tax system.4 While these arguments certainly pave the way
for our present line of research, they are too vague for our purposes. They refer to generic
commodities, and not specically to education, a service that can of course be bought on the
market as many others but has its own peculiarities. Two aspects, normally recognised in the
literature on education, but not in that on rationing, are, in our opinion, worth emphasising:
1. unlike most commodities, education is purchased not by those who consume it, but by a
third party (at least for primary and secondary education, the parents bear the costs of
education, while the benet will be reaped, in time, by the children);
2. the enjoyment of its fruits, no matter whether they are seen in terms of investment or
consumption value, requires out-of-pocket expenses and a large amount of time, i.e. ample
opportunity costs (education is a long process: it goes on for years).5
2An exception is represented by Cigno (2012) who recommends compulsory school enrolment in developing
countries where child labour is an issue in order to remedy for problems deriving from asymmetric information
on the use of childrens time. For a comparison with our results see section IV on Alternative policy frameworks.
3For example, see Go (2009) for a paper presenting a political economy explanation for the American achieve-
ment of universal free public schooling in a historical perspective.
4The surveys by Balestrino (1999, 2000) illustrate the state of the art in this stream of work at the end of the
90s. For a more recent outlook, see Currie and Gahvari (2008).
5According to Cipolla (1969), opportunity costs appear to be the single most important factor behind the
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In order to account for these peculiarities, we employ a household economics approach. We
recognise that there are two actors involved in the purchase and consumption of education, the
parents and the child (point 1 above) and we model time allocation in a detailed way, trying to
account for its key role in the educational process (point 2). From a normative standpoint, we
develop an argument showing i) that education policy is socially desirable, and ii) that it must
preferably include a period of compulsory schooling rather than follow another intervention
design.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section II discusses how policy objectives should
be formulated. Section III presents the model of educational choice and the laissez-faire out-
come. Section IV analyses di¤erent public policies. Finally, section V contains some concluding
remarks.
II Horizontal and vertical equity in educational policy
A distinction is often made between vertical and horizontal equity. The former refers to the
equalisation of resources among agents, and is normally pursued via progressive tax systems;
the latter implies an equal treatment of equals, and requires that policies do not discriminate
motivelessly. In our setting, then, vertical equity would be pursued by redistributing income
among the parents, while the most important achievement in terms of horizontal equity would
be that all the children are given equal access to education what one might call "equality of
opportunity". In this sense, an equitable distribution of education among the children could be
judged fair.
Typically, normative economic analyses present the governments objective in terms of ver-
tical equity and e¢ ciency objectives. The social planner is assumed to maximise a Paretian,
quasi-concave social welfare function that will pick up a point on the second-best Pareto-frontier
and satises the vertical equity requirements implied by the convexity of the social indi¤erence
curves.
The policy approaches to education that we mentioned above fall, broadly speaking, within
this framework: the optimal education policy is dened together with the optimal intra-generational
development of education systems. Thus, as long as the kids time was valuable for help in the farm or for
employment in the Dickensian factories of the early industrial revolution, large-scale education programs were
not undertaken in the Western world, but became important starting from the second half of the XIX century,
when productivity began to be high enough to make the kidswork dispensable.
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redistribution policy as the result of social welfare maximisation. In the beckerian view, the two
policies coincide, as the optimal income tax also remedies the inequality in education achieve-
ments; in the exchange view, a specic educational subsidy is needed in addition to the income
tax. It is interesting to notice, however, that the achievement of vertical equity among families
does not come at the expense of equality of opportunity for the children: income is redistributed
among the parents or educational expenditure is subsidised and, at the same time, the children
are all given access to education.
This outcome is in fact somewhat surprising, as it is often found that horizontal and vertical
equity requirements conict with each other (see e.g. Auerbach and Hassett 2002); however, it
is predicated on models of educational choice that, in our view, do not take into full account the
implications of the two peculiar characteristics of education that we highlighted before, namely
the role of the parents and the relevance of the opportunity costs.
We shall see that in our model, where these two characteristics are thoroughly explored,
neither the policy recommendation of the beckerian model nor that of the exchange model work
as far as equality of opportunity is concerned: a di¤erent policy instrument, to wit compulsory
education, is needed. This, despite the assumption of altruism within the family that we
maintain throughout.
One way of viewing this is to say that, in our model, equality of opportunity for the children
must be pursued with a specic quantity control, rather than with the usual armoury of price
controls. In this sense, our model may be considered as an attempt to apply the now sizable
literature on equality of opportunities to education.6 Indeed, as stated by Brunori et al. (2012,
p. 765), equality of educational opportunity is a widely agreed principle, almost universally
considered to be a funding principle of education policy.There are of course di¤erent interpre-
tations of the principle in the literature; in any case, even the more restrictive interpretations
do not deny the importance of a minimum education level (Friedman 1962, p. 89, for example,
states that both the imposition of a minimum required level of schooling and the nancing of
this schooling by the state can be justied by the neighborhood e¤ectsof schooling.)
The approach by Roemer (1998) is particularly close to our set-up. Indeed, Roemer points
6This literature started with Rawls (1971), and nowadays equality of opportunity can be considered the
prevailing conception of social justice in contemporary western societies (Ferreira and Peragine 2014, p. 2).
Beyond the case of education, such approach has been applied to di¤erent areas of public policy such as health,
anti-poverty schemes, income taxation and redistribution. For a recent survey on this topic, see Roemer and
Trannoy (2015).
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out that equality of opportunity can be obtained by equalizing or compensating all those in-
dividuals circumstances a¤ecting the individuals nal outcome for which she cannot be held
responsible, and letting, instead, unaltered the e¤ects of choices for which individuals are to
be held responsible. Of course, this requires that it must be possible to distinguish the share
of inequalities due to unequal circumstances (opportunities) from the one due to individual
choices. Now, the rst characteristic of (primary and perhaps secondary) education we men-
tioned above is that it is not chosen by its users, who cannot therefore taken to be responsible
for the consequences of the choice. Then, a compensation principle can be applied to neutralize
inequality in education investments.
Our position seems to capture closely what has historically happened with the introduction
of compulsory education in the Western countries (see Section I above) and also the way in which
current policy proposals for the developing countries are formulated, namely directly in terms
of percentages of children who have access to primary education. For example, at the World
Education Forum in Dakar, 2000, Goal 2 was stated as: "Ensuring that by 2015 all children,
particularly girls, children in di¢ cult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities,
have access to, and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality". The
same objective has been re-a¢ rmed again by the UNDP with the Sustainable Development
Goals: Goal 4 calls for achieving inclusive and quality education for all, and more specically
it "ensures that all girls and boys complete free primary and secondary schooling by 2030."
No mention, in these statements, is made of the parents or of the tax system: it is said that
100% of the children must receive compulsory education, which means that this specic policy
instrument is called for, and no other. In other words, policy makers in the past, as well as
today, appear to have pursued and to pursue horizontal equity objectives alongside the more
commonly assumed vertical equity/e¢ ciency objectives, and appear to have believed and to
believe that the former require a dedicated instrument. In this paper, we will see how these
prescriptions follow naturally from our model of educational choice.
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III A model of educational choice
We consider a nite-horizon model.7 The economy is made of two-person households: one
parent and one child. We posit that, in order to earn an income, each parent supplies a certain
amount of labour l to the market at a wage rate denoted by w; w varies continuously on [0; w]
according to a density function F (w), and the agents have unit mass.
Income can be spent on the parents own consumption C and the childs education e (we
normalise the childs consumption to zero).8 Education also requires time d (of the child): in
fact, we attribute extreme importance to the fact that education is a very time-intensive activity.
Total time endowment is normalised to unity for both agent types. The time of the parent that
is not employed on the market, denoted by H, together with the time of the child that is
not employed for educational purposes, denoted by h, is used to produce a non-marketable
household public good y, non-rivalrous and non-excludable within the family; for simplicity, no
other input is required. A perfect substitute for the households public good, z, is available on
the market at price p.
We assume that the parent is altruistically linked to the child. For simplicity, altruism is
taken to be full, i.e. the parent weighs the kids utility as her own. This is the simplest setting in
which the model can be developed, and also one in which the cards are not too obviously staked
in favour of policy intervention, which indirectly reinforces our arguments. The arguments could
however be adapted for a model based on the exchange view of the family.
The laissez-faire outcome
Let us begin by considering what would happen in a free market, in which there is no government
intervention. The household production function (concave and increasing) is
y = y (H;h) : (1)
7The model could be recast in an OLG framework. All the results reached in the simpler case treated here
would carry over, and we would have to add many unnecessary details, with the consequent risk of making the
model lose its focus.
8Appendix A briey discusses the case in which parents transfer to the children resources that can be directly
consumed as well as resources meant to be invested in education.
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We assume that the child cannot produce without a contribution from her parent, who must at
least coordinate and supervise home production.9 Formally, H is an essential input, so that
y (0; h) = 0; yHh = yhH > 0: (2)
Also, we introduce
x = x (e; d) ; (3)
a strictly concave and increasing function representing the value of education for the child
in consumption terms (the childs gross income). We assume that e and d are technological
complements (the more time you spend on education, the more e¤ective is the money you
spend on it and viceversa), and that both time and money are essential to production,
x (0; d) = x (e; 0) = 0; xed = xde > 0: (4)
Assuming additive separability for the utility functions, we write the parents preferences as
[U (C) + F (y (H;h) + z)] + [u (x (e; d)) + f (y (H;h) + z)] : (5)
We take the sub-utility functions U () and u () to be concave, whereas for F () and f () we
require strict concavity; U () and u () refer to private consumption for the parent and the kid,
respectively, and F () and f () refer to the household public good still for the parent and the
kid, respectively.
Normalising the price of the consumption good to unity, the budget constraint for the parents
is
C + pz + e = wl: (6)
The time constraints for the parent and the kid, respectively, are
H + l = 1 and h+ d = 1: (7)
Using these elements, we write the parents problem as one of choosing C; H; z; e and h so as
to
Max [U (C) + F (y (H;h) + z)] + [u (x (e; 1  h)) + f (y (H;h) + z)]
s.t. C + pz + e  w(1 H) = 0;
H  0; z  0; h  0:
9This seems a reasonable assumption. Our qualitative results would carry over also in its absence but the
exposition would be less straightforward.
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For simplicity, and without any consequence for our policy analysis, we exclude from our con-
sideration the equilibria where H = 1 and C = 0, implying that no time is devoted to market
labour, or where x = 0, implying that no time and money is devoted to education.10 Moreover,
we take it that there always is a positive level of consumption of the household public good
(either y or z must exceed zero).
Given the above, the rst order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:
U 0 =  (C) ; (8) 
F 0 + f 0

yH  w; plus complementary slackness (H) ; (9)
F 0 + f 0  p; plus complementary slackness (z) ; (10)
u0xe =  (e) ; (11) 
F 0 + f 0

yh  u0xd, plus complementary slackness (h) ; (12)
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives, and  is the marginal utility of income.
To begin with, let us then investigate the question whether the household public good is
purchased on the market or produced internally. The intuition behind the analysis is straight-
forward: y and z are perfectly substitutable, therefore the parent will use the least expensive, or,
to put it in a di¤erent language, she will act according to where her comparative advantage lies,
in home production or in market work. The actual analysis is however somewhat complicated
by the fact that the "price" of y is non-linear.
If the parent chooses home-production, and assuming an interior solution in which both
10 If we were to consider an equilibrium with x = 0; it could be proved that the households where d = e = 0
would be either all those that produce the public good at home or the ones with a relatively higher wage among
them. The existence of this equilibrium would not a¤ect our argument.
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time-inputs, H and h, are used,11 it must be the case that
F 0 + f 0 =
U 0
yH
w and F 0 + f 0 =
u0
yh
xd; (13)
where we used (8), (9) and (12). In turn, this implies that the input mix in home-production is
dened according to the following arbitrage equation:
U 0
w
yH
= u0
xd
yh
; (14)
that is, the opportunity cost of the parents home-time equals that of the childs home-time.
If the parent instead chooses to purchase z, (10) would become, using again (8):
F 0 + f 0 = U 0p: (15)
Then, comparing the rewritten FOCs (13) and (15), we can see that the household public
good will be produced at home if w=yH < p (i.e. if the opportunity cost of home-production,
measured by the ratio of the productivities on the market and at home, is less than the market
price of the substitute) and purchased on the market otherwise.
It is important to establish how w=yH varies with w. We assume the following:
@ (w=yH)
@w
> 0; (16)
which corresponds to the idea that yH , at most, grows moderately (less then proportionally) as
w increases.12 As w and w=yH increase, there will be some wage rate w for which
w
yH
= p: (17)
11Having already excluded equilibria where z = 0 and h = 1 (d = 0); this means that we do not consider
the case where (9) is binding and (12) is slack, i.e., where (F 0 + f 0) yH = U 0w and (F 0 + f 0) yhjh=0 < u0xdjd=1,
implying H > 0 and h = 0 (d = 1). Since we know from Appendix C that dd=dw < 0 (and dh=dw > 0) when
h > 0; this could happen either for very low values of w, or for all the low wagers (i.e. all those households
that produce y at home). In the former case our qualitative results would not be a¤ected. In the latter case,
instead, children are never employed in home production and thus equality of opportunity would be achieved.
This however means that it is never protable to employ children in home production, independently of the level
of w. Since H is decreasing in w for the low wagers, as the comparative statics will tell us, it must be the case
that (F 0 + f 0) yhjh=0 < u0xdjd=1 holds even for those low wagers that have a relatively high w and thus a high
level of F 0 + f 0: This does not seem to represent a general case although it might, for example, represent an
economy rapidly shifting from a rural to an industrial structure.
12For a similar assumption, see Becker and Murphy (2007).
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Then, all households with w < w produce y at home, while those with w > w purchase z on
the market.
Consider now the wage rate w: we can think of it as a threshold level at which the household
is marginally indi¤erent between producing the public good at home and buying it externally
and thus simultaneously produces y at home and buys z on the market.13 Indeed, at w, the
FOCs (9), (10) and (12) all hold with equality, which implies that the mix in the produc-
tion/consumption of the household public good is dened according to the following arbitrage
equation:
U 0
w
yH
= u0
xd
yh
= U 0p. (18)
In general, we do not know whether w is unique, or rather there is an interval of wage rates
for which (18) holds and households still simultaneously produce y at home and buy z on the
market even if the proportion of y to z varies (as well as the levels of H and h). The policy
analysis does not change much in either case: as we will see, our arguments are driven by the
existence of a social divide between high-income parents who fully educate their children, and
low-income parents who employ part of their kidstime for the domestic production process,
and such a divide occurs independently of whether w is unique or not.
To keep things simple, we will therefore focus on the situations in which w is unique
(Appendix B shows that, for example, this happens under the assumptions that yhh = yHH = 0
and U 00 = u00 = 0). In such a case, we can establish the following threshold:
w = pyH : (19)
All households with w < w produce y at home, while those with w > w purchase z on
the market; the intermediate group made only of the agents at w = w consume a mix of
home-produced and purchased public good.14
We will thus have:
1. a group of low-wage households, w 2 [0; w]; where the kids time is split between school
and home-production (h > 0 and therefore d < 1), the parent works partly at home and
13This is due to the "price" of y being non linear and increasing, so that it is protable to produce y only up
to the point where its marginal price equals p:
14As H is decreasing in w for the households that produce y at home, we cannot exclude the case where H = 0
at w so that the public good will be completely purchased on the market. This however would not a¤ect our
analysis.
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partly in the market (H > 0 and l > 0, with income wl), and the household public good
is not purchased on the market (z = 0) except for those exactly at w (for whom z > 0);
2. a group of high-wage households, w 2 (w; w]; where the kids go to school full time (h = 0
and d = 1), the parents work full time (H = 0 and l = 1, with income w), and the
household public good is purchased on the market (z > 0).
We can now describe the main comparative statics results.
Comparative statics
The details of the comparative statics analysis for the general case, where w is not necessar-
ily unique, are reported in Appendix C: here, we give the main results and a few words of
interpretation.
For the high wagers, we saw that H = h = 0, that is l = d = 1. Substituting the budget
constraint (6) into the utility function (5), the optimisation problem becomes
max
z;e
[U (w   pz   e) + F (z)] + [u (x (e; 1)) + f (z)] ; (20)
and the consumption mix is determined by the arbitrage condition
F 0 + f 0
p
= u0xe: (21)
The value for e that emerges is then combined with d = 1 to give the equilibrium value for x.
The comparative statics results are:
@z
@w
 0; @e
@w
 0: (22)
Summing up, all the kids from the high-wage families are educated full time; expenditure
on both the household public good and education are non-decreasing in the wage rate; as a
consequence, so is x. Income is trivially increasing in the wage rate.
As for the low wagers, we know that z = 0 for w < w. So, the problem is
max
H;e;h
[U (w   e  wH) + F (y (H;h))] + [u (x (e; 1  h)) + f (y (H;h))] : (23)
The consumption mix is determined by
U 0 = u0xe; (24)
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while the input mix (in the production of y) is determined by (18) above. The emerging values
for e and d determine x. The comparative statics results are
@H
@w
< 0;
@e
@w
> 0;
@h
@w
> 0: (25)
The low wagerslabour supply is increasing in the wage rate, and therefore so is their income.
Expenditure in education increases in the wage rate. However, the higher is w, the more the
kids will be working at home: in other words, as w increases the low wagers replace their own
home time with that of the kids as working outside home become more advantageous. We
cannot say whether the total returns to education x increase, because less school-time makes
expenditure less e¤ective (d and e are complements).15
For the households at w, both @H@w and
@h
@w are obviously negative when w
 is unique but
there are no unambigous results available for the general case.
The characteristics of the market equilibrium
From the analysis above, it is clear that the economy presents an "educational divide". First
of all, educational expenditure increases with the wage rate, so there is of course a source of
di¤erence there. But, mostly, the di¤erence originates from the fact that those households whose
wage is in the upper range give their children a full-time education, while the households with
lower wage rates send their kids to school only for a part of their time, and employ the remaining
time for the production of a household public good. Further, since time and expenditure are,
plausibly, seen as complementary inputs in our model, it follows that the money that the high
wagers spend is more e¤ective than that spent by the low wagers, thereby further accentuating
the divide.
The divide has nothing to do with altruism, which is just as strong for the low as for the
high wagers. Indeed, the main force behind the separation between those who enjoy a full-time
education and those who dont is the logic of comparative advantages for the production of the
15 If one should make an assumption, it would probably be safe to postulate that increasing expenditure will
entail little compensation for a reduced time at school, which is probably mostly irreplaceable due to the teachers
inputs, the peer e¤ects, etc.. An alternative approach is that proposed by Glewwe (2002) for less developed
countries where years of schooling and school quality are considered as alternative inputs in the production of the
child cognitive skills. In that set-up, when the learning e¢ ciency of the child increases or the cost of education
decreases, parents prefer to increase the quality of the children education rather than the quantity because the
latter has a greater opportunity cost in terms of less time for the child market work.
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household public good. If such an advantage lies in home-production, i.e. w=yH is lower than
p, then the child will not achieve a full-time education.
If, as we argued in Section II above, it is plausible to assume that the government has (also)
a horizontal equity objective such as granting equal opportunities to all the children, then,
the educational divide is of course a matter of concern. In this case, it would clearly become
desirable to devise some kind of policy package so as to allow also the low wagers to send their
children to school full time.
IV Alternative policy frameworks
We now assess the performance of the policy packages that economists usually recommend.
Since we are in an altruistic setting, we start with a linear income tax with tax rate  > 0 and
lump-sum subsidy T > 0. In a beckerian model, using such a redistributive instrument would
lead to a social equilibrium in which both vertical and horizontal equity objectives are attained
(see Sections 1 and 2 above).
Our results, however, stand in stark contrast, as we show that the income tax is not entirely
e¤ective as far as horizontal equity is concerned. Things do not change if we add educational
subsidies; in fact, we argue that no price instrument can guarantee equality of opportunity in
our setting. In our framework, the presence of redistributive taxation, which is necessary to
achieve some degree of vertical equity, damages horizontal equity. Therefore, we consider the
merits of an alternative policy in which we replace the educational subsidies with a compulsory
education package consisting in a given amount of per-child expenditure and a given number of
years of mandatory schooling, and perform a full analysis of this case. Basically, this outcome is
predicated on our characterisation of education as requiring both money and time: it is indeed
the time allocation that cannot be controlled via the usual tax instruments.
Remarkably, the tax instruments remain ine¤ective, as far horizontal equity is concerned,
also if upgraded to non-linearity. Not even personalised lump-sum taxes can remedy the lack of
equal opportunities intuitively this occurs because the marginal conditions ruling the allocation
of time are not changed by lump-sum taxes (by the very denition of the latter). Also incentive-
compatible non-linear policy instruments would still require a dedicated policy for horizontal
equity purposes: actually, non-linear price controls are basically equivalent to personalised
quantity controls in that they allow the social planner to control the agentstime and budget
allocations, so the requirement that all children go to school full-time in that setting is equivalent
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to a compulsory education policy.
Hence, we have taken all tax instruments to be linear: this allows us to keep the model
manageable as well as based on reasonable assumptions on what the policy makers can observe
(non-linear taxes require knowledge of the level of consumption, purchase of the household
public good, educational expenditure and hours of school for all households), without losing
anything of substance in terms of results.
Redistributive taxation with educational subsidies
With an income tax in place (where  is the marginal tax rate and T the uniform subsidy) plus
educational subsidies for educational expenditure and hours of school ( and s, respectively)
the budget constraint becomes
C + pz + (1  ) e+ (1  )wH = (1  )w + T + (1  h) s: (26)
We assume that also the future income of the children is taxed at the same rate as that of the
parents so that children earn (1  )x () after tax. The utility function therefore is:
[U (C) + F (y (H;h) + z)] + [u ((1  )x (e; 1  h)) + f (y (H;h) + z)] : (27)
The FOCs are as follows:
U 0 =  (C) ; (28) 
F 0 + f 0

yH   (1  )w; plus complementary slackness (H) ; (29)
F 0 + f 0  p; plus complementary slackness (z) ; (30)
u0 (1  )xe = (1  ) (e) (e); (31) 
F 0 + f 0

yh  u0 (1  )xd + s plus complementary slackness (h) . (32)
Note that
U 0 = u0
(1  )xe
(1  ) (33)
by (28) and (31). If the parent chooses home-production, and assuming an interior solution in
which both time-inputs, H and h, are used, it must be the case that
F 0 + f 0 =
U 0
yH
(1  )w and F 0 + f 0 = u
0
yh
(1  )xd + u
0
yh
s (1  )xe
1   ; (34)
where we used (28), (29), (32) and (33). The arbitrage condition for the allocation of time
becomes:
U 0
yH
w =
u0
yh

xd +
s
1  xe

: (35)
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Notice that the subsidy s on school hours works as a way of increasing the return to expenditure
in education. Money is fungible, and although in this case it is given for the time the kid spends
at school it can be used for anything: the parents altruism makes her split the amount of the
subsidy between her consumption and the expenditure for the child, both of which are therefore
actually subsidised.
If the parent instead chooses to purchase z, (30) would become, using again (28):
F 0 + f 0 = U 0p: (36)
Then, comparing the rewritten FOCs (34) and (36), we can see that the household public good
will be produced at home if (1  )w=yH < p and purchased on the market otherwise. By
replicating the analysis of the free-market case, we will nd a wage rate
w =
p
1   yH (37)
such that all households with w < w produce y at home, those with w > w purchase z on the
market, and those at w do both. Suppose now that a social welfare maximisation exercise has
been performed, and that the desired level of redistribution has been actuated via the optimally
set tax instruments. In principle, the tax instruments may act on H (recall that the agents at
w produce part of the household public good domestically) and thus on yH , which would mean
that w is a function of all of them. However, these would all be second-order e¤ects. If we
treat them as negligible, we are left with the main e¤ect coming from  :
@w
@
=
p
(1  )2 yH > 0: (38)
Relative to the free-market situation, then, in an equilibrium with policy there will be less
agents who educate their kids full time! This is because the marginal tax rate  alters the
comparative advantage situation: working outside home becomes less advantageous, and more
agents choose to produce the household public good domestically. The achievement of a redis-
tributive objective in vertical equity terms via the income tax would therefore limit equality of
opportunity.16 The price subsidies are ine¤ective to remedy this. We would of course expect the
subsidies to increase educational expenditure: but it is doubtful whether this might compensate
16 Incidentally notice that also a tax on z, which we do not consider in the model to keep things simple, would
have a negative e¤ect on the threshold wage rate - much in the same way as an increase in the income tax
rate. Since the tax would have mostly a redistributive purpose (hitting a good that is only consumed by the
high-wagers) the logic is the same: vertical equity conicts with horizontal equity.
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the kids who have been obliged to leave full-time schooling for the reduced educational time
(we have already made this point above see fn. 15).17
In our setup, therefore, the standard beckerian prescription of using redistributive policy to
make even the less well-o¤ prone to educate their children is ine¤ective, despite the assumption
of altruism within the family, as far as horizontal equity objectives are concerned. Rather,
redistributive taxation has a negative e¤ect, since the presence of a marginal tax rate forces
some individuals not to educate their children full time. This cannot be remedied by the
education subsidies, which mainly work on the intensive margin.
Redistributive taxation with a compulsory education package
Given the weak performance of the standard set of policy tools, it makes sense to investigate
whether compulsory education can be more e¤ective. Consider then, along with the linear
income tax with tax rate  > 0 and lump-sum subsidy bT > 0, a compulsory education package
(E;D) where E is per-child expenditure and D is the number of years of mandatory schooling.
The parents can top up both rations, adding expenditure and school time beyond the mandatory
level: then, e and d are now the amounts of expenditure and school-time that the parent can
employ for topping up the compulsory levels, respectively.
We characterise the policy problem as one of choosing the policy tools that maximise a
social welfare function, thereby satisfying a vertical equity requirement, subject to a constraint
that imposes a horizontal equity requirement. The constraint is simply that D be set at unity,
thus forcing h = d = 0: this way, all kids will go to school full time (setting a lower level would
be self-defeating, as the high wagers would adjust in order to have D + d = 1, while the low
wagers would continue to have D + d < 1). This corresponds to a current practice in virtually
all Western countries today.18
17Part (or all) of the low wagers will see their income increase thanks to the poll subsidy. This will translate
in a higher level of educational expenditure. Given the complementarity of e and d, this will make both d and x
increase for those households who were below the threshold even without the policy. Those households that switch
from high to low wagers however do not necessarily see their income increase (they could be net contributors to
the tax system). In any case they will face a strong reduction in d (recall that there is a discountinuity in d at
w) which is likely to imply a reduction in x even if their income and consequently e were to increase.
18A parallel can be drawn with health economics, where some theories of justice analyse the interpersonal
distribution of health by establishing di¤erent types of condition upon outcomes that need to be satised before
solving any social planner maximisation problem. For example, a common condition is that a minimum decent
level of health has to be fullled for some specied groups, and no trade-o¤ is allowed between such a goal and
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We further investigate whether it is optimal to set also a xed level of expenditure E along
with the tax instruments; this means in principle that the total expenditure E + e might di¤er
for kids from di¤erent families, although we will focus below on a case in which it is the same
for all.
By substituting the constraint that D = 1 into the utility function, the latter becomes
[U (C) + F (y (H; 0) + z)] + [u ((1  )x (E + e; 1)) + f (y (H; 0) + z)] ; (39)
while the budget constraint is
C + pz + e+ (1  )wH = (1  )w + bT : (40)
Notice that it is possible to write the budget constraint also as
C + pz + (e+ E) + (1  )wH = (1  )w + T; (41)
that is, as if the agent were paying the educational expenditure herself. In fact, as formally
shown in Appendix D, T now also covers E.
The problem of the agent is then to maximise (39) by choice of C, H; z; and e s.t. (41) and
the non-negativity constraints. The FOCs are as follows:
U 0 =  (C) ; (42) 
F 0 + f 0

yH   (1  )w; plus complementary slackness (H) ; (43) 
F 0 + f 0
  p; plus complementary slackness (z) ; (44)
u0 (1  )xe   plus complementary slackness (e) . (45)
The choice between home production and market purchase depends on the measure of com-
parative advantage, just as before. The threshold wage rate is as in (37), and the distinction
between high- and low wagers works in the same way, with the added twist that, for the high
wagers, the presence of D = 1 is of no consequence because this is what the parents would have
chosen anyway.
The indirect utility for both types of parent can be written as a function of the policy
instruments, V = V ( ; T; E) ; and the derivatives w.r.t. the policy tools are
@V
@T
=  > 0;
@V
@
=  w (1 H)  u0x < 0; (46)
@V
@E
= u0 (1  )xe    < 0 if e = 0: (47)
any other (Williams and Cookson 2000).
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Notice that H > 0 for the low wagers (including the agents at w see Appendix E) and H = 0
for the high wagers in the expression for @V=@: The sign of @V=@E depends on whether E
exceeds the quantity that the agent would have chosen in the free market or not: @V=@E is
negative if it does, equal to 0 otherwise.
The next step requires us to check the comparative statics in this new setting with the policy
instruments. This task is made extremely cumbersome by the fact that there are many possi-
bilities concerning the extent to which the compulsory educational package actually constrains
family choices. We noticed that D = 1 is always infra-marginal for the high wagers, while for
the low wagers the constraint will denitely bite. Instead E may or may not bite for both types.
Here we focus on the case that seems more interesting,19 i.e. the one in which E constrains
the choices of all households. Therefore, e = 0 for all agents. This is the scenario in which the
quantity constraints interfere the most with the free choices of the agents: can in this extreme
case those constraints be welfare-improving?
Let us start from the comparative statics (calculations are found in Appendix E). Notice
that the high wagers only choose z. We nd that
@z=@w  0; @z=@  0; @z=@T  0; @z=@E  0: (48)
As for the low wagers, they only choose H, and we nd that
@H=@w < 0; @H=@ > 0; @H=@T  0; @H=@E  0: (49)
Finally, the agents at w choose both H and z, and we nd that
@H=@w < 0; @H=@ > 0; @H=@T = @H=@E = 0;
@z=@w > 0; @z=@ < 0; @z=@T  0; @z=@E  0: (50)
The interpretation is rather straightforward: it may be mentioned that the absence of any
impact by either T or E on the time allocation for the agents at w is due to the fact that for
them the shadow price of home time, (1  )w, equals the value of its marginal product, i.e.
pyH see (37).
19As far as the e¤ects of the education policies are concerned, the conclusions in the other cases are analogous
to those discussed here. The results for the other cases are available from the authors.
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Optimal second-best policy
We now consider a second-best policy problem in which both vertical and horizontal equity
requirements are accounted for. The rst aspect is taken care of by the standard assumption
that the government maximizes a quasi-concave social welfare function subject to the revenue
constraint; the second aspect is instead represented by the presence of the compulsory education
scheme that establishes D = 1.20
Assuming that the objective function is a generalised utilitarian, and using the indirect
utility functions dened in the previous sub-section, we may write
max
;T;E
R w
0  (w)V ( ; T;E;w)G (w) dw
s.t. 
R w
0 x (E; 1)G (w) dw + 
R w
0 wG (w) dw   
R w()
0 [wH (w)G (w)]dw   T = R;
where  (w) ; with 0 < 0, represents a set of welfare weights, G (w) is the wage distribution
function, and R is a xed revenue requirement. The FOCs areR w
0  (w)
@V
@
G(w)dw + 
nR w
0 x (E; 1)G(w)dw +
R w
0 wG(w)dw 
  R w()0 wH (w)G(w)dw    R w()0 w@H (w)@ G(w)dw   wH (w)G(w)@w@

= 0; (51)
R w
0  (w)
@V
@T
G(w)dw   


R w()
0 w
@H (w)
@T
G(w)dw + 1

= 0; (52)
R w
0  (w)
@V
@E
G(w)dw + 
R w
0 xeG(w)dw  
R w()
0 w
@H (w)
@E
G(w)dw

= 0; (53)
where the derivatives with respect to the indirect utility functions are given by (46) and (47)
and  is the multiplier of the governments budget constraint. We can then state the main
results concerning the policy rules.
First, rearrange the second FOC:R w
0  (w) (@V=@T )G(w)dw

   R w()0 w@H (w)@T G(w)dw = 1; (54)
20Alternatively, the horizontal equity requirement could be accounted for by assuming a di¤erent social welfare
function which could also capture a measure of inequality of educational opportunities as a negative externality
for the society. For example, social welfare could be negatively a¤ected by a higher variance in the distribution
of x. In this case, the argument in favour of a compulsory education scheme reducing such a variance would
nd an even higher support. A di¤erent approach is followed by Gasparini and Pinto (2006) where the choice
of the optimal policy in terms of cash versus in-kind transfers depends, among the others, on the degree of the
rich peoples concern about education quality dispersion. In this work, income redistribution serves to counter a
negative externality coming from the fact that rich peoples utility negatively depends on the di¤erence between
the average education quality levels of the rich and the poor groups in the society.
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the net social marginal utility of income, inclusive of its e¤ect on revenue and weighted by ;
equals unity. This is a standard result that characterises the optimal T .
The third FOC can be rearranged as follows:

R w
0 xeG(w)dw  
R w()
0 w
@H (w)
@E
G(w)dw

=  
R w
0  (w) (@V=@E)G(w)dw

; (55)
that is, at an interior solution, the marginal benet of education expenditure in terms of in-
creased revenue must equal the marginal cost in terms of forcing the agents out of the chosen
consumption bundle recall that @V=@E < 0 when the ration bites. Increased revenue depends
on the fact that setting E higher leads to a larger future income of the children x, as well as
to less home-production time, or equivalently more time devoted to market work (@H=@E  0
when the ration bites), and therefore more taxable income from the parents.
This analysis presupposes that  > 0. In order to check whether this is the case, we can
rearrange the rst FOC. To this end, dene
	  R w0 x (E; 1)G(w)dw + R w0 wG(w)dw   R w()0 wH (w)G(w)dw: (56)
We can then write
 =
	+
R w
0  (w) (@V=@)G(w)dw=R w()
0 w
@H(w)
@ G(w)dw + w
H (w)G(w) pyH
(1 )2
; (57)
where we have used (38).
From the fact that @H=@ > 0 we deduce that the denominator in (57) is positive. This
term represents the total revenue loss associated with a marginal increase in  : the reduction in
labour supply implies a reduction of tax base, and the fact that w varies in the same direction
as  implies a further reduction because more agents start employing home-production to get
the household public good, and therefore work less. The larger is this term, the smaller will be
 .
The rst term at the numerator, 	, is, as we just said, the marginal revenue gain from the
tax. It is positive becauseR w
0 x (E; 1)G(w)dw +
R w
0 wG(w)dw >
R w()
0 wH (w)G(w)dw: (58)
The second term at the numerator of (57) is negative because @V=@ < 0 and represents the
marginal welfare loss. Therefore, if the revenue gain exceeds the welfare loss, the numerator is
positive as well. In that case, we have  > 0; and the larger is the di¤erence between the two
terms above the line, the larger is the tax rate.
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To sum up, in order to have E > 0 it must be the case that  > 0: only if some form of
redistributive taxation is in place, it may be optimal to force (at least some of) the agents to
spend on education more than they would have done in a free market. The desirability of the
quantity controls is justied by the fact that they imply a gain in revenue terms. If this gain
is large enough to compensate the costs in terms of displaced consumption, then some form of
quantitative restriction is welfare-improving.21
A remarkable feature of the result is that redistributive taxation and education policy in the
form of compulsory education appear to be strongly intertwined. Neither works without the
other, if we assume that both horizontal and vertical equity are policy concerns. Redistributive
taxation satises the vertical equity requirements but damages the future earnings of (some of)
the children,22 as we know from the analysis of the impact of the tax rate on the threshold
wage rate; horizontal equity thus requires a specic education policy, in the form of mandatory
schooling. At the same time, the full package of compulsory education, in which agents are
forced to provide resources to nance the expenditure on education for their children, cannot
be optimal without redistributive taxation.
Finally, let us notice that, as far as educational expenditure is concerned, the logic of our re-
sult partially overlaps the one prevailing in the standard analyses of in-kind transfers (Balestrino
1999, 2000), in which the desirability of the quantity restriction depends upon its capability
to increase revenue. In those analyses revenue is commonly generated through a substitution
process in the consumption basket: the typical policy recommendation is that quantity con-
straints should be applied to commodities which are complementary to heavily taxed ones.
Education, however, when publicly provided above the level freely chosen by the households
generates revenue not through a chain of substitution e¤ects, but by directly raising taxable
income. Of course, this comment only concerns educational expenditure and relates to vertical
equity issues. In our setting, however, compulsory schooling is recommended primarily on hor-
21 It may be worth noting that, had we chosen D optimally rather than have it xed at the outset, we would
have reached a similar conclusion to that for E, that is, we would have found that it is socially desirable, on
vertical equity grounds, to establish mandatory schooling. Of course, there would not have been, at this level
of generality, any guarantee that the optimal level of D were exactly unity, so in this sense we would not have
necessarily achieved a full equality of opportunity.
22As we have discussed in footnote 17, the redistributive policy will benet the children of those households
that would be low wagers even without the policy but would damage the children of the households that switch
from high to low wagers.
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izontal equity grounds: no price instrument is capable to correct the behaviour of those agents
who prefer to employ their childrens time for domestic production rather then for education.
From this perspective, the logic underpinning our result di¤ers from the one employed in the
standard analyses of in-kind transfers.
Our result also di¤ers from Cigno (2012) that prescribes compulsory schooling as part of
the optimal policy in a developing country setting where children spend part of their time in
performing covert labour (equivalent to our home production) and may devote some other time
to working on the market. The rest of the time is spent at school but "e¤ective" education
time also depends on the other activities (a tired kid or a kid who has no time for homework
has a low e¤ective education time). Compulsory enrolment (not a precise school time as in our
model) becomes optimal due to asymmetric information on the use of the childrens time, but is
not needed in the absence of informational problems when lump-sum taxes and subsidies allow
to achieve both e¢ ciency and perfect equity.
V Concluding remarks
We began by asking whether there is a reason why education policy should involve a mandatory
and (virtually) free-of-charge schooling period, as it commonly does in the Western countries.
Economists should be particularly interested in obtaining an answer, as quantity controls are
traditionally considered outperformed by price controls in standard economic theory. Having
established that education policy must, for some reason, be implemented, many would argue
that it should take the form of a price subsidy (making education less costly should make agents
more prone to purchase it for their children) or simply be embedded in tax policy (redistributing
resources in favour of the poor should automatically help them to send their children to school).
Now, it is well-known, at least since Guesnerie and Roberts (1984), that the superiority of
price controls is only valid in rst-best, and that quantity controls can be welfare-improving in
a variety of second-best contexts: the last 20 years have seen a vast research e¤ort on this that
traces its roots to the contributions of Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Boadway and
Marchand (1995) and continues to this day (e.g. Blomquist et al. 2010). Our work follows this
stream of the literature, and aims to ll a blank space, because none of those works has dealt
specically with education as we believe it should be characterised, namely as i) an extremely
expensive and time-consuming process that ii) involves a decision-maker (the parent) who is
not the direct beneciary (the child).
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Using a model that accounts for both these features, we have rst depicted a free market
situation in which some agents ("high wagers") educate their children full time and spend a
sizable amount of resources on them, while others ("low wagers") educate them only partially
(and in principle might even not educate them at all).23 This outcome is generated by the
presence of an alternative usage of the childrens time: rather than be sent to school, they
can be employed in producing a household public good. The high wagers can a¤ord to replace
this home-produced good with a marketed substitute; the low wagerscomparative advantage,
instead, lies in home-production. The free-market equilibrium is iniquitous where parents are
concerned, due to their having di¤erent exogenous skills and thus di¤erent incomes (a vertical
equity problem), and also where children are concerned, even if the parents are fully altruistic,
because the kids receive di¤erent educations depending on whether they are born in a high-wage
or a low-wage family. Further, the di¤erences in the education they receive today imply that
there will be a disparity in earning abilities tomorrow due to choices made by the parents, not
by themselves (a horizontal equity problem).24
Public policy is thus called for, both for vertical and horizontal equity reasons. In this
framework, we argued that it is indeed socially optimal to introduce a compulsory education
package, using a standard redistributive tax system to nance it. Mandatory schooling fully
compensates the kids for the disadvantages at which their parentschoices might have put them.
Adding a mandatory expenditure requirement forces the parents away from their equilibrium
choices, which is of course costly but entails also an advantage in terms of increased revenue
that can be used for redistributive purposes. Indeed, it may nance the poll subsidy, that goes
to the family as a whole, and the educational expenditure for the children, including those from
the less well-o¤ families.
From the point of view of horizontal equity, a compulsory education policy is shown to
23This result can be linked to the recent empirical literature that tries to analyse how exogenous changes in
parentseducation due to variations in compulsory schooling laws may a¤ect the intergenerational transmission
of education. For example, Piopiunik (2014) provides evidence that individuals with more schooling (and thus
on average higher wages) value their kidseducation more highly.
24Another possible reason for public intervention, which we do not explore but just mention briey here, is the
fact that the children, despite all having the same ability, are educated at di¤erent level: this might indeed have
e¢ ciency implications. The laissez-faire equilibrium is clearly e¢ cient from the point of view of the parents (or
of the families as a whole), but if we look at it from the point of view of the children (e.g. if the social welfare
function were given by the sum of childrens sub-utility functions) this is no longer the case.
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be superior to the use of price subsidies, that only work on the intensive margin, i.e. boost
education expenditure for those who would have educated their children full time anyway in
a free market, but are unable to induce those who didnt educate their kids full time to start
doing so. And we also argued that redistributive taxation alone is in fact counter-productive,
as it forces more agents than in laissez-faire to avoid educating their children full time, because
it tips the comparative advantage balance in favour of making child household work more
desirable. This suggests that redistributive taxation and compulsory education are best seen as
complementary policies if we assume that the government pursues both vertical and horizontal
equity objectives.
Appendix A - A model of consumer choice with bequests
In the main text we assume that parents can transfer resources to their children only through
investments in education. Here, we allow the parents to transfer resources that can be directly
used for consumption, such as, for example, bequests. Let then the parent choose the transfer
c. Parents preferences are
[U (C) + F (y (H;h) + z)] + [u (c+ x (e; d)) + f (y (H;h) + z)] ; (A1)
and the budget constraint is
C + pz + c+ e = wl: (A2)
The time constraints for the parent and the kid, respectively, are
H + l = 1 and h+ d = 1: (A3)
Using these elements, we write the parents problem as one of choosing C; H; z; c; e and h so
as to
Max [U (C) + F (y (H;h) + z)] + [u (x (e; 1  h)) + f (y (H;h) + z)]
s.t. C + pz + e+ c  w(1 H) = 0;
H  0; z  0; c  0; e  0; h  0:
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The rst order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:
U 0 =  (C) ; (A4) 
F 0 + f 0

yH  w; plus complementary slackness (H) ; (A5)
F 0 + f 0  p; plus complementary slackness (z) ; (A6)
u0 =  (c) ; (A7)
u0xe =  (e) ; (A8) 
F 0 + f 0

yh  u0xd plus complementary slackness (h) . (A9)
Our rst question is whether the parent prefers to transfer resources to the child using the
consumption good or investing in education. From (A7) and (A8), it is immediate to see that
(xe > 1)  !
 
u0 < ; u0xe = 
  ! (c = 0; e > 0) ; (A10)
(xe < 1)  !
 
u0 = ; u0xe < 
  ! (c > 0; e = 0) ; (A11)
while xe = 1 would lead to an undetermined result. The outcome is very sharp because c and
x are (reasonably) perfect substitutes. The intuition is clear: each unit of consumption that
the parent transfers forward becomes, within the assumptions of the present model, exactly
one unit of extra consumption for the child, while each unit of consumption that the parent
transforms into one unit of educational expenditure may become more or less than one unit
of extra consumption for the child depending on the returns to said expenditure. The result
can clearly be generalised to more complicated settings: the parent will always choose the most
e¢ cient way of transferring resources to the child.
The model that we consider in the paper is basically one in which xe > 1 everywhere for
all households. In the opposite extreme case in which xe < 1 everywhere for all households, we
would have e = 0, which implies d = 0 because both inputs are essential to the production of
x; we would not have any education at all, which would make the model uninteresting for our
purposes.
Mixed situations could be discussed, though. If some agents choose to educate their children
while others rely on consumption transfers, the horizontal equity problem would be exacerbated.
An especially clear case would emerge if, for example, the marginal returns to education xe were
to depend on the parents wage: we might assume, in line with the empirical literature (e.g.
Mayer 1997 and Blau 1999) that the parents marketable skills (her wage in our model) and the
childs ability to learn and prot from what she has learned (her x () function in our model)
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are positively, although not necessarily perfectly, correlated. If so, it might well be the case that
most of the high wagers in our model send their kids to school while most of the low wagers do
not thereby worsening the horizontal equity issues.
Appendix B - An example in which w is unique
From (5) and (6), the parents maximization problem is
max
H;e;d;z
U (w   e  pz   wH) + F (y (H; 1  d) + z) + u (x (e; d)) + f (y (H; 1  d) + z) ; (B1)
where U; u and y are concave, F , f and x are strictly concave. We consider the special case
where i) yHH = yhh = 0, and ii) U 00 = u00 = 0; also, recall that xed > 0 and yhH > 0 by
assumption. In order to prove that w corresponds to a point and not to an interval, we must
prove that the FOCs can simultaneously hold as equalities for only one value of w. Focusing on
an interior solution for all of the four variables H; e; d; z; the FOCs are
 U 0w +  F 0 + f 0 yH = 0 (H) ; (B2)
 U 0 + u0xe = 0 (e) ; (B3)
   F 0 + f 0 yh + u0xd = 0 (d) ; (B4)
 U 0p+ F 0 + f 0 = 0 (z) : (B5)
By totally di¤erentiating, we have:
 U 0dw + h F 00 + f 00 (yH)2i dH + [0]de+
   F 00 + f 00 yHyh +  F 0 + f 0 yHhdd+ (F 00 + f 00)yHdz = 0; (B6)
  [0]dw + [0]dH + u0xeede+ u0xeddd+ [0]dz = 0; (B7)
[0]dw    F 00 + f 00 yhyH +  F 0 + f 0 yhHdH + u0xdede+
+
h 
F 00 + f 00

(yh)
2 + u0xdd
i
dd   F 00 + f 00 yhdz = 0; (B8)
[0]dw +

(F 00 + f 00)yH

dH + [0]de   F 00 + f 00 yhdd+ F 00 + f 00dz = 0: (B9)
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Now, let26666664
a11
a21
a31
a41
37777775 =
26666664
(F 00 + f 00) (yH)2 < 0
0
  [(F 00 + f 00) yhyH + (F 0 + f 0) yhH ]
(F 00 + f 00)yH < 0
37777775 ;
26666664
a12
a22
a32
a42
37777775 =
26666664
0
u0xee < 0
u0xed > 0
0
37777775 ;
26666664
a13
a23
a33
a43
37777775 =
26666664
  [(F 00 + f 00) yHyh + (F 0 + f 0) yHh]
u0xde > 0
(F 00 + f 00) (yh)2 + u0xdd < 0
  (F 00 + f 00) yh > 0
37777775 ;
26666664
a14
a24
a34
a44
37777775 =
26666664
(F 00 + f 00) yH < 0
0
  (F 00 + f 00) yh > 0
F 00 + f 00 < 0
37777775 ;
where the sign of a13 = a31 is not determined. Then
26666664
a11 a12 a13 a14
a21 a22 a23 a24
a31 a32 a33 a34
a41 a42 a43 a44
37777775
26666664
dH=dw
de=dw
dd=dw
dz=dw
37777775 =
26666664
U 0
0
0
0
37777775 (B10)
and the comparative statics signs are as follows. Take dH=dw rst:
sgn dH=dw = sgn U 0

a22 a23 a24
a32 a33 a34
a42 a43 a44
 < 0; (B11)
as the determinant is negative because of the maximization condition. Consider then de=dw:
sgn de=dw =  sgn U 0

a21 a23 a24
a31 a33 a34
a41 a43 a44
 : (B12)
Given that a21 = a24 = 0; it is
sgn de=dw =  sgn U 0( a23)(a31a44   a41a34) =
= sgn U 0u0xde
 (F 00 + f 00)  F 0 + f 0 yHh > 0: (B13)
Consider then dd=dw:
sgn dd=dw = sgn U 0

a21 a22 a24
a31 a32 a34
a41 a42 a44
 : (B14)
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Given that a21 = a24 = 0; and that a31a44   a41a34 =  (F 00 + f 00) (F 0 + f 0) yHh > 0; it is
sgn dd=dw = sgn U 0a22(a34a41   a31a44) = u0xee(F 00 + f 00)
 
F 0 + f 0

yHh > 0: (B15)
Consider nally dz=dw:
sgn dz=dw =  sgn U 0

a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
a41 a42 a43
 : (B16)
Given that a21 = a42 = 0; it is
sgn dz=dw =  sgn U 0a41(a22a33   a32a23)  a31a22a43	 =
 sgn U 0
8<: (F
00 + f 00) yH
h
u0xee

(F 00 + f 00) (yh)2 + u0xdd

  (u0xed)2
i
+
  [  (F 00 + f 00) yhyH + (F 0 + f 0) yHh]u0xee [  (F 00 + f 00) yh]
9=; =
 sgn U 0
n 
F 00 + f 00
 h
yHxdd   yH
 
u0xed
2
+
 
F 0 + f 0

yHh(u
0)2xeeyh
io
< 0 (B17)
We then have:
dH=dw < 0; de=dw > 0; dd=dw > 0; dz=dw < 0: (B18)
We can use this comparative statics to prove that it is not possible to have the four FOCs
holding as equalities over an interval of values of w: In fact, for the four FOCs to hold as
equalities it must be the case that
w
yH
= p; (B19)
over the whole interval but this would imply that h has to increase as w increases, contradicting
dd=dw > 0: Hence, with this specication, w is unique.
Appendix C - Comparative statics in laissez-faire
Recall that we are using a separable utility function throughout, and that we require U () and
u () to be concave, F (), f () and x () to be strictly concave.
High wagers (w > w)
In the case of high wagers, we can write the maximisation problem as
max
z;e
(U (w   pz   e) + F (z)) + (u (x (e; 1)) + f (z)) : (C1)
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The FOCs are
 U 0p+ F 0 + f 0 = 0 (z) ; (C2)
 U 0 + u0xe = 0 (e) : (C3)
By totally di¤erentiating, we have:
 U 00pdw + U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00dz + U 00pde = 0; (C4)
 U 00dw + U 00pdz +
h
U 00 +

u00 (xe)2 + u0xee
i
de = 0: (C5)
Therefore:24 U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00 U 00p
U 00p U 00 +

u00 (xe)2 + u0xee

3524 dz=dw
de=dw
35 =
24 U 00p
U 00
35 : (C6)
Then, the signs are as follows
sgn dz=dw = sgn
h
U 00p

U 00 +

u00 (xe)2 + u0xee
i
   U 002 p  0; (C7)
sgn de=dw = sgn
h 
U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00

U 00    U 00p2i  0: (C8)
Low wagers (w < w)
In the case of low wagers, we can write the maximisation problem as
max
H;e;d
U (w   e  wH) + F (y (H; 1  d)) + u (x (e; d)) + f (y (H; 1  d)) : (C9)
The FOCs for an interior solution are:
 U 0w +  F 0 + f 0 yH = 0 (H) ; (C10)
 U 0 + u0xe = 0 (e) ; (C11)
   F 0 + f 0 yh + u0xd = 0 (d) : (C12)
Totally di¤erentiating, we have:
  U 00 (1 H)w + U 0dw + hU 00w2 +  F 00 + f 00 (yH)2 +  F 0 + f 0 yHHi dH + U 00wde 
   F 00 + f 00 yHyh +  F 0 + f 0 yHhdd = 0; (C13)
  U 00 (1 H)dw + U 00wdH + hU 00 + u00 (xe)2 + u0xeei de+
+

u00xexd + u0xed

dd = 0; (C14)
0dw    F 00 + f 00 yhyH +  F 0 + f 0 yhHdH +  u00xdxe + u0xde de+
+
h 
F 00 + f 00

(yh)
2 +
 
F 0 + f 0

yhh +

u00 (xd)2 + u0xdd
i
dd = 0: (C15)
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Now, let 26664
a11
a21
a31
37775 =
26664
U 00w2 + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH < 0
U 00w  0
  [(F 00 + f 00) yhyH + (F 0 + f 0) yhH ]
37775 ; (C16)
26664
a12
a22
a32
37775 =
26664
U 00w  0
U 00 + u00 (xe)2 + u0xee < 0
u00xexd + u0xed
37775 ; (C17)
26664
a13
a23
a33
37775 =
26664
  [(F 00 + f 00) yHyh + (F 0 + f 0) yHh]
u00xdxe + u0xde
(F 00 + f 00) (yh)2 + (F 0 + f 0) yhh + u00 (xd)2 + u0xdd < 0
37775 ; (C18)
where the signs of a31; a13; a32 and a23 are not determined. Then26664
a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
37775
26664
dH=dw
de=dw
dd=dw
37775 =
26664
[U 00 (1 H)w + U 0]
U 00 (1 H)
0
37775 : (C19)
Further assuming that
 U
00
U 0
<
1
(1 H)w; (C20)
the comparative statics signs are as follows. Take dH=dw rst:
sgn dH=dw =  sgn
8<:
24U 00 (1 H)w + U 0| {z }
+
350@a22a33   a32a23| {z }
+
1A (C21)
+U 00 (1 H)| {z }
 

a23
?
a31
?
  a21  a33 

| {z }
?
9>>>=>>>; :
Since (a22a33   a32a23) is positive because of the maximization condition, the rst term is
also positive. For U 00 < 0, the sign of the second term is ambiguous. To sign it, we assume that
there is a moderate complementarity both between d and e and between h and H, namely we
suppose that
 u
00
u0
>
xde
xdxe
;
 F
00 + g00
F 0 + g0
>
yhH
yhyH
;
31
which imply that a23 < 0 and a31 > 0, respectively. Since (a23a31   a21a33) is then non positive,
it follows that
dH=dw < 0 and dl=dw > 0: (C22)
Consider then de=dw:
sgn de=dw =
 sgn
8>>><>>>:U
00 (1 H)| {z }
 

a11a33   a31a13

| {z }
+
+

U 00 (1 H) + U 0| {z }
+

a32
?
a13
?
 a12  a33 

| {z }
?
9>>>=>>>; (C23)
We know that the term a11a33 a31a13 is positive because of the maximization conditions, and,
because of our previous assumptions, we are considering the case where a32a13   a12a33  0;
then,
de=dw > 0: (C24)
Finally, let us consider dd=dw:
sgn dd=dw =
=  sgn
8>>><>>>:

U 00 (1 H) + U 0| {z }
+

a12 
a23
?
  a13
?
a22 

| {z }
?
+ U 00 (1 H)| {z }
 

a21 
a13
?
 a11  a23?

| {z }
?
9>>>=>>>; (C25)
Since a23 < 0 and a31 > 0, it immediately follows that
dd=dw < 0 and dh=dw > 0: (C26)
Appendix D - Equivalence of revenue constraint
To see that public budget constraint (40) is equivalent to budget constraint (41), let us rst
write the government budget if E is paid for by the government itself and then if E is paid by
the parent:

R w
0 w (1 H (w))G(w)dw + 
R w
0 x (E + e;D + d)G(w)dw   E = bT ; (D1)

R w
0 w (1 H (w))G(w)dw + 
R w
0 x (E + e;D + d)G(w)dw = T: (D2)
To check the equivalence, integrate (40) to yield
32
R w
0 (C + pz + e)G(w)dw   (1  )
R w
0 w (1 H)G(w)dw = bT ; (D3)
and substitute the revenue constraint (D1); then integrate (41) to yield
R w
0 (C + pz + e)G(w)dw + E   (1  )
R w
0 w (1 H)G(w)dw = T; (D4)
and substitute (D2) (recall that the agents have unit mass). It is immediate to see that the
resource constraints computed using the two procedures coincide:
R
(C + pz + e)G(w)dw + E + 
R w
0 x (E + e;D + d)G(w)dw =
=
R w
0 w (1 H)G(w)dw: (D5)
Appendix E - Comparative statics under compulsory education
High wagers (w > w)
Having no need to employ their time in home production, the high wagers set H = h = 0: all
the parents time goes into working and all the kids time goes into education. The constraint
that D = 1 is of no consequence because that is what the parents would have chosen anyway.
On the contrary, E is an actual constraint (e = 0). Then, high wagers choose z to maximise
[U ((1  )w + T   pz   E) + F (z)] + [u ((1  )x (E; 1)) + f (z)] : (E1)
The FOC is:
 U 0p+ F 0 + f 0 = 0; (E2)
and it follows that
@z
@w
=    U
00p (1  )
U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00
 0; @z
@
=   U
00wp
U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00
 0; (E3)
@z
@T
=    U
00p
U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00
 0; @z
@E
=   U
00p
U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00
 0: (E4)
Low wagers (w < w)
Low wagers are constrained by both E and D (d = 0, e = 0). Consequently, they only choose
H to maximise
[U ((1  )w + T   E   (1  )wH) + F (y (H; 0))] + [u ((1  )x (E; 1)) + f (y(H; 0)] : (E5)
33
The FOC is
  (1  )U 0w +  F 0 + f 0 yH = 0: (E6)
Hence, since
 U
00
U 0
<
1
(1  )w(1 H) ; (E7)
from (C20), we have that
@H
@w
=     (1  )U
0   (1  )2w (1 H)U 00
U 00 (1  )2w2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2
=
    (1  ) (U
0 + (1  )w (1 H)U 00)
U 00 (1  )2w2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2
< 0; (E8)
@H
@
=   w [U
0 + (1  )w (1 H)U 00]
U 00 (1  )2w2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2
> 0; (E9)
@H
@T
=     (1  )wU
00
U 00 (1  )2w2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2
 0; (E10)
@H
@E
=   (1  )wU
00
U 00 (1  )2w2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2
 0: (E11)
w-wagers
The agents at w are constrained by both E and D (d = 0, e = 0); they choose H and z to
maximise
U ((1  )w + T   E   pz   (1  )wH) + F (y (H; 0) + z)+
+u ((1  )x (E; 1)) + f (y (H; 0) + z) : (E12)
The FOCs are
 U 0 (1  )w +  F 0 + f 0 yH = 0 (H) ; (E13)
 U 0p+ F 0 + f 0 = 0 (z) : (E14)
Hence
(1  )w
yH
= p; (E15)
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as expected. Total di¤erentiation yields
 
h
(1  )U 0 + (1  )2 (1 H)wU 00
i
dw +
h
U 0w + (w)2 (1  ) (1 H)U 00
i
d+
  (1  )wU 00 dT + (1  )wU 00dE+h
(1  )2 (w)2 U 00 +  F 00 + f 00 (yH)2 +  F 0 + f 0 yHHi dH+
+

(1  )wpU 00 + (F 00 + f 00)yH

dz = 0; (E16)
  (1  ) (1 H) pU 00dw + w (1 H) pU 00d   U 00p dT + U 00pdE+
+

(1  )wpU 00 + (F 00 + f 00)yH

dH +

p2U 00 + F 00 + f 00

dz = 0: (E17)
Now, let24 a11
a21
35 =
24 (1  )2 (w)2U 00 + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH < 0
(1  )wpU 00 + (F 00 + f 00)yH < 0
35 ;
24 a12
a22
35 =
24 (1  )wpU 00 + (F 00 + f 00) yH < 0
p2U 00 + F 00 + f 00 < 0
35 :
Then: 24 a11 a12
a21 a22
3524 dH=dw
dz=dw
35 =
24 (1  ) (U 0 + (1  ) (1 H)wU 00)
(1  ) (1 H)U 00p
35 ; (E18)
24 a11 a12
a21 a22
3524 dH=d
dz=d
35 =
24  w (U 0 + w (1  ) (1 H)U 00)
 w (1 H)U 00p
35 ; (E19)
24 a11 a12
a21 a22
3524 dH=dT
dz=dT
35 =
24 (1  )wU 00
U 00p
35 ; (E20)
24 a11 a12
a21 a22
3524 dH=dE
dz=dE
35 =
24   (1  )wU 00
 U 00p
35 : (E21)
Using (C20) and the fact that (1  )w = pyH by (E15), we have:
sgn dH=dw = sgn
24 (w ((1  ) (U 0 + (1  ) (1 H)U 00))) a22+
  ((1  ) (1 H)U 00p) pa12
35 < 0; (E22)
sgn dz=dw = sgn
24 a11 ((1  ) (1 H)U 00p)+
 a21 ((1  ) (U 0 + (1  ) (1 H)wU 00))
35  0; (E23)
35
sgn dH=d = sgn
24 ( w (U 0 + w (1  ) (1 H)U 00)) a22+
  ( w (1 H)U 00) pa12
35 > 0; (E24)
sgn dz=d = sgn
24 a11 ( w (1 H)U 00p)+
 a21 ( w (U 0 + w (1  ) (1 H)U 00))
35  0; (E25)
sgn dH=dT = sgn

(1  )wU 00  U 00p2 + F 00 + f 00  U 00p (1  )wpU 00 +  F 00 + f 00 yH	
= sgn

U 00
 
F 00 + f 00

[(1  )w   pyH ]
	
= 0; (E26)
sgn dz=dT = sgn
8<:
h
(1  )2 (w)2 U 00 + (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2 + (F 0 + f 0) yHH
i
U 00p+
  (1  )wU 00 [(1  ) pwU 00 + (F 00 + f 00)yH ]
9=; =
= sgn
24 (U 00)2 (1  )2 (w)2 p+ U 00p (F 00 + f 00) (yH)2+
+(F 0 + f 0) yHHU 00p  (1  )2 (w)2 (U 00)2 p  (1  )wU 00(F 00 + f 00)yH
35 =
= sgn
 
F 0 + f 0

yHHU
00p
  0: (E27)
Also, clearly, dH=dE = 0 and dz=dE  0.
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